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Abstract: Because of concern that OECD tariff reductions will translate into 
worsening export performance for the least developed countries, trade preferences have 
proven a stumbling block to developing country support for multilateral liberalization. 
We examine the actual scope for preference erosion, including an econometric 
assessment of the actual utilization, and also the scope for erosion estimated by modeling 
full elimination of OECD tariffs and hence full MFN liberalization-based preference 
erosion.  Preferences are underutilized due to administrative burden—estimated to be at 
least 4 percent on average—reducing the magnitude of erosion costs significantly. For 
those products where preferences are used (are of value), the primary negative impact 
follows from erosion of EU preferences. This suggests the erosion problem is primarily 
bilateral rather than a WTO-based concern. 
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1. Introduction 
Non-reciprocal trade preferences have been long granted by developed countries to 
various developing countries. Early in the post-World War II history of the GATT 
system, the pattern of these preferences reflected past colonial trade ties. In 1968, the 
UN Committed for Trade and Developmen t (UNCTAD) recommended the creation of 
a ‘Generalized System of Preferences’ (GSP) under which industrialized countries would 
grant trade preferences to all developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis. While 
UNCTAD has addressed a wider spectrum of issues in international economic relations, 
in the area of international trade its primary goal was to modify the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clause underpinning the GATT by (partially) exempting developing countries 
from this obligation, while at the same time encouraging developed countries to 
discriminate in favor of imports from developing countries. A key principle was (and is) 
the idea that such “special and differential treatment” be granted on the basis of “non-
reciprocity”, reflecting the premise that “treating unequals equally simply exacerbated 
inequalities” (UNCTAD, 2004). 
 The jury remains out on whether trade preferences have actually made a 
substantive difference in terms of enhancing the welfare of recipient countries. The 
developing countries that were granted the fewest preferences at its inception in the 
1960s, those in East Asia, have subsequently grown the fastest. Conversely, those granted 
the deepest preferences, including sub -Saharan African least developed countries 
(LDCs), have not managed to increase their per capita incomes or diversify their export 
bundles significantly in the last 40 years. (See Figure 1.)  To a large extent both 
developments—rapid and sustained growth in Asia and the absence thereof in much of 
Africa—are not due to OECD trade policies, but rather reflect domestic policies and 
institutions. Most would agree that the major constraint on export diversification and 
expansion in Africa is on the supply side.  
Whatever the intended and actual impacts of trade preferences, they are a central 
issue in ongoing efforts to negotiate further multilateral trade liberalization. Middle-
income countries are increasingly concerned about the discrimination they confront in 
OECD markets as a result of the better access granted in these mar kets to other 
industrialized countries—because of free trade agreements—and to poorer or “more 
preferred” developing countries. Conversely, preferences are used as an argument by the 
LDCs and African countries against a general liberalization of trade and removal of 
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trade-distorting policies in agriculture.  These countries worry about the potential 
negative effects of an erosion of their preferential access. 1  
In this paper, we explore the economic relevance of trade preferences in the 
context of WTO-based multilateral liberalization—the ongoing Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. This involves both an econometric assessment of the extent to which 
preference schemes are actually used (de facto as opposed to de jure preferences) as well as 
a numerical assessment of the dollar magnitude of potential preference erosion 
associated with further WTO-based, nondiscriminatory tariff reductions. In this analysis 
we assume that the principle of non-reciprocity continues to prevail—i.e., we model the 
effects of OECD liberalization while assuming that the developing countries benefiting 
from preferential access do not reduce their own protection. Many have argued that non-
reciprocity has allowed many developing countries these countries to self-marginalize 
themselves in GATT/WTO negotiations, as they received market access benefits without 
having to actually engage in the process of negotiating concessions. Whatever one’s 
views on this question, from the perspective of quantifying the magnitude of potential 
preference erosion non-reciprocity is an appropriate constraint to impose, as what 
matters is to assess the loss of benefits stemming from the removal of an explicit 
development-motivated policy that has been put in place by OECD countries. From this 
perspective it is not relevant that developing countries might benefit as well from their 
own liberalization or that of other developing countries, or that such potential benefits 
may be quite substantial. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start in Section 2 with a brief review and 
summary of the major existing preference programs. In Section 3 we assess 
econometrically the magnitude of the preference margins that are implied by current 
programs, by estimating the threshold preference margin (the difference between MFN 
and preferential treatment) below which preference programs are irrelevant because of 
compliance costs (paperwork, red tape, documenting origin, etc.). This threshold is about 
4 percent—implying that preferences can only matter for those products where the 
difference between MFN and preferential tariffs is higher than this—a relatively small 
                                              
1 They are also concerned about the potential negative terms of trade effects of multilateral liberalization 
insofar as this raises the price of their imports, especially of goods that currently benefit from subsidies and 
protection in OECD markets, by more than the price/quantity of their exports. Both types of fears have 
been supported by many NGOs, who argue that LDCs have little to gain from the current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, and may have more to lose. See Limão (2005) for a theoretical analysis of 
the incentives for a coalition of preference providers and recipients to seek to limit MFN reforms, and 
evidence for the EU and US that preferential trade arrangements do have a constraining impact on 
multilateral liberali zation.  
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set. In Section 4 we quantify an upper bound for the potential aggregate magnitude of 
erosion, assuming OECD members abolish all trade-distorting policies. As part of this 
analysis, we integrate the results of the analysis of compliance costs as identified in 
Section 3. We find that such costs imply that the potential benefits of trade preferences 
for developing countries are likely to be substantially offset, thus reducing the potential 
magnitude of preference erosion.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Preferences in the GATT/WTO System 
In 1971, a waiver to the most-favored -nation clause was approved by the contracting 
parties to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to permit GSP schemes. In 
1979 they adopted the so -called ‘Enabling Clause’ in 1979, which established the legal 
framework for the GSP. Although Japan, Canada, Australia and several other countries 
implemented national GSP programs in favor of developing countr ies, the schemes of 
the EU and the US have been and continue to be the most important given the size of 
the two markets concerned.2 
 The first GSP preference scheme of the EU was implemented in 1971 for a ten-
year period and has been renewed periodically. The scheme provides nonreciprocal 
preferences with lower tariffs or completely duty-free access for imports from 178 
developing countries and territories into the EU market. GSP preferences are not part of 
contractual agreements with the recipient countries.3 The general arrangements cover 
roughly 7,000 products, of which 3,250 are classified as non-sensitive and 3,750 are 
classified as sensitive products. The tariff preferences offered by the general 
arrangements differ according to the sensitivity of the products concerned: non-sensitive 
products enjoy duty free access to the EU market, while sensitive products benefit from 
a tariff reduction. These arrangements provide, as a rule, for a reduction of MFN ad 
valorem duties by a flat rate of 3.5 percentage points. These products comprise around 
36% of tariff lines (EC Council Regulation No.2501/01, 10 December 2001).  As 
sensitive products are generally the ones with high MFN rates, the proportionate impact 
of the preference can be rather small. An important exception to this rule of a flat rate 
reduction is granted to the textiles and clothing sectors which enjoy a percentage 
                                              
2 See Hoekman and Özden (2005) for a review of the extensive literature in this area on which what 
follows draws upon.  
3 A new GSP regulation (Council Regulation No. 2501/2001 as amended by Council Regulation No. 
2211/2003) implements the current s cheme from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2005. New guidelines 
for the next 10-year cycle 2006-15 are currently being prepared. 
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reduction of 20%. For specific duties a percentage reduction of 30% is the general rule. 
Where duties include ad valorem and specific duties, only the ad valorem duties are reduced. 
 Country eligibility for the EU GSP program is determined on the basis of 
“indices” that combine the development and specialization level of the country:  
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where Y  i (YE U) is the GDP per capita in the beneficiary country (EU) and X i (XE U) is 
the manufactured exports of the beneficiary country (EU) to the EU (beneficiary 
country).  The index increases in value as the beneficiary country becomes more 
developed and/or runs a surplus in manufactured goods trade with the EU. It has a value 
of zero, for example, if the beneficiary country has the same GDP per capita as the EU 
and has balanced trade.  If the country has GDP per capita above $8,210 and the index 
has a value greater than –1, it is automatically removed from the GSP program. South 
Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, among others, were removed from the GSP program 
on the basis of these criteria. 
 A second graduation criterion is country/sector-specific and is based on the 
extent o f specialization: the relationship between the proportion of the imports in a given 
sector from a given country to the total EU imports in that sector and this country’s 
share of total EU imports. A higher specialization index indicates that the county’s 
exports to the EU are more concentrated in that category. As a result of this criterion, 
Brazil, India, China, Argentina and many other countries have lost eligibility for a wide 
range of product categories.   
 In 2001, the EU adopted new graduation criteria. All countries designated as 
high-income by the World Bank lose eligibility for all products automatically. A country 
can lose sectoral eligibility under two circumstances.  First, the country in question has a 
development index I  greater than –2 and it supplies more than 25% of EU total imports.  
Second, the country (i) has development index I larger than –2, (ii) has sectoral 
specialization index higher than a threshold level (depending on the actual development 
index) and (iii) it supplies more than 2%  of EU total imports.  
 The EU GSP program has a safeguard clause that allows preferences to be 
suspended for certain products/countries if imports “cause or threaten to cause serious 
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difficulties to a Community producer.”4 The EU has also instituted “special incentive 
arrangements” that reward compliance with International Labor Organization 
Conventions, protection of environment and combating drug production and trafficking. 
Countries that benefit from these special arrangements receive additional preferences on 
certain products in the sensitive list.  Finally, human right violations, money laundering, 
corruption and violation of various international conventions on the environment may 
result in withdrawal of preferences. 
 A special arrangement under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, which is 
incorporated into the GSP preference scheme, is provided for the 49 UN-defined least 
developed countries (LDCs). The EBA scheme provides duty-free access for all products 
covered and originating in the beneficiary country, with the exception of imports of fresh 
bananas, rice, and sugar.5 Tariffs on these items will be reduced gradually to zero by 2006 
for bananas and by 2009 for rice and sugar, with tariff quotas for rice and sugar increased 
annually during the transition. A key feature of the EBA is that, in contrast to the 
‘general’ GSP, preferences are granted for an unlimited period and are not subject to 
periodic review.   
 In addition to the GSP, the EU has another preference program, which is limited 
to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under what is now the Cotonou 
convention. This scheme is less generous in terms of duty reduction than the EBA 
scheme. However in some other aspects, such as cumulation rules, it is more generous.  
The first agreement between the European Economic Communities (EEC) and the ACP 
countries dates back to 1963 when the “Yaoundé Agreements” were signed. These were 
in effect during 1963-75. The objective was to foster economic cooperation between the 
EU and ACP countries, including through development assistance. A significant amount 
of resources was directed towards francophone Africa to build up infrastructure during 
the decolonization period. After the United Kingdom joined the EEC, the Lomé I 
Agreement was signed (in force between 1975-80) covering 46 ACP countries and the 
EEC Member States. At this time the developing country signatories joined together to 
form the ACP (in the Georgetown Agreement). The Lomé Agreement introduced trade 
preferences for most ACP exports to the EEC, including special trade protocols for 
                                              
4 The US program, in effect, has the same rule in place: any US producer can petition the USTR for GSP 
privileges to be revoked due to real or potential injury.   
5 For a detailed discussion on the impact of EU preferences for LDCs under Everything But Arms see 
Brenton (2003). 
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sugar, bananas, beef and veal.6 These trade preferences and protocols were extended for 
further periods under successive Lomé Conventions: Lomé II (1980-85), Lomé III 
(1985-90) and Lomé IV (1990-2000).  
 After the expiration of Lomé IV a new Partnership Agreement with the ACP 
states was signed in Cotonou in 2000. Key objectives include poverty reduction and 
bringing more stability in the ACP: “Focusing on poverty reduction as its principal 
objective, to be achieved through political dialogue, development aid and closer 
economic and trade cooperation, this agreement will shape a significant part of the 
European Union's dealings with the rest of the world.”7 Cotonou will change the trade 
relationship between EU and ACP partners. During 2000-07, the prevailing regime with 
its preferences and protocols on sugar, banana, and beef and veal was to be maintained 
in a modified form. During this time, non-LDC ACP members were to negotiate 
economic cooperation agreement s under which the one-way EU trade preferences would 
be replaced by reciprocal market access commitments, i.e., more standard free trade 
agreements. These new trade arrangements were to enter into force by January 1, 2008, 
with the transition to a full implementation of the negotiated agreements to be spread 
over at least 12 years.  
ACP countries are granted preferences that often exceed those available under 
the GSP.  Most industrial products have duty and quota free market access whereas the 
preferences are less comprehensive for agricultural products.  In 2000 duties were still 
applied to 856 tariff lines (837 of which were agricultural products). Of these, 116 lines 
were excluded from the Cotonou Agreement. An additional 301 tariff lines were eligible 
for reduced duties, subject to specific quantitative limits (tariff quotas) set for the ACP 
countries as a group. The remaining 439 products were eligible for reduced duties 
without quantitative limits. 
 Preferences are equally complex in the United States, which offers non-reciprocal 
trade preferences the GSP as well as through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (as 
amended), the Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA), and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). The US GSP program was introduced in 1976. It divides 
eligible countries into two groups based on their income levels –  all developing countries 
and the subset of LDCs. At the time of writing, all eligible countries pay zero tariffs on 
                                              
6 The banana protocol gives duty-free entry for specific quotas of bananas into the EU market. Under the 
sugar protocol, EC annually buys a fixed quantity of sugar from ACP producers at its internal sugar price.  
7 Press release IP/00/640 Brussels, 21 June 2000, “The European Community and its Member States sign 
a new Partnership Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states in Cotonou, Benin.” 
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around 4,650 tariff lines; LDCs have duty-free market access for an additional 1,750 
lines. The 1974 Trade Act allows the President to confer GSP eligibility on any country 
except those that (a) do not offer reasonable and equitable market access for American 
goods, (b) do not adequately and effectively protect US intellectual property rights, (c) do 
not reduce trade-distorting investment policies and export practices, (d) harbor 
international terrorists, (e) nationalize American property without compensation, (f) are 
members of a commodity export cartel causing "serious disruption to the world 
economy," or, are (g) communist states (except those that have been granted permanent 
normal trading status).  The law stipulates other criteria that may be used in eligibility 
decisions, such as (a) level of economic developmen t, (b) protection of workers' and 
human rights and (c) whether the country receives preferences from other countries.  
Certain articles are prohibited from receiving GSP treatment. These include most textiles, 
watches, footwear, handbags, luggage and certain apparel.   
 One of the key features of the GSP program is that a country may lose eligibility 
for a specific product if its exports exceed a certain “competitive need limit,” at the time 
of writing $110 million per tariff line.  If the country in question has a market share larger 
than 50 percent of total US imports in that category, it may also lose the GSP eligibility.8  
GSP eligibility can be removed at the country, product, or country-product level. The 
President has discretion over when and how to apply these criteria.  In practice, an 
Assistant US Trade Representative chairs an interagency committee which makes 
eligibility and graduation decisions after reviewing petitions from interested parties (the 
country in question, import-competing domestic firms, labor unions, other firms, human 
rights/environmental NGOs, etc.). Hudec (1987) concludes that a consequence is that 
import-competing lobby groups have made GSP a bastion of unregulated protectionism 
in the United States. Since the program first entered into force in 1976, 36 of the 154 
eligible countries have "graduated" from the GSP program (including Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Botswana). Major countries remaining 
eligible include Brazil, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, and Thailand.   
The AGOA initiative came into effect in 2000 with the aim to boost US bilateral 
trade with sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Currently 37 countries are eligible for 
preferential treatment under the AGOA. The preferential treatment consists of duty-free 
and quota-free access to the US markets for all products covered by GSP plus 1800 new 
                                              
8 However, there is a de minimis  waiver.  The President has the discretion to waive the Competitive Need 
Limit if total US imports in that category from all countries (both GSP eligible and ineligible) does not 
exceed $16.5 million (in 2003).   
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items. Furthermore, AGOA entrenches the current preferences available under the GSP 
by guaranteeing benefits until September 2008. It also eliminates the GSP competitive 
need limitation for African countries and offers less restrictive rules of origin to eligible 
African countries, allowing them to import more of their inputs from third countries 
such as China.9 
 The Andean Trade Preference Act was enacted in 1991 to combat drug 
production and trafficking in the Andean countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru. The program offers trade benefits to help these countries develop and strengthen 
legitimate industries. ATPA was expanded under the Trade Act of 2002, and is now 
called the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. It provides duty-free 
access to U.S. markets for approximately 5,600 products.  
 The CBI is intended to facilitate the economic development and export 
diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies. Initially launched in 1983 through the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and substantially expanded in 2000 
through the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the CBI currently 
provides 24 beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most 
goods. CBTPA entered into force in 2000 and will be in effect until 2008. 
 This summary overview indicates that (i) preference programs differentiate 
between developing countries and (ii) that there is significant “conditionality” associated 
with eligibility, including in non-trade areas and in terms of criteria that must be satisfied 
to benefit from preferential access. To assess the magnitude of potential preference 
erosion associated with further MFN liberalization these factors need to be taken into 
account. 
 
3. Administrative Burden and the Utilization of Preferences 
A key question when evaluating the benefits arising from trade preferences to the 
beneficiaries is the costs of obtaining the preferences. When traders request preferences 
they have to comply with administrative and technical requirements. The most important 
requirements are related to compliance with rules of origin. These define the conditions 
that a product must satisfy to be originating from the exporting country that has been 
granted the preferential access. The main justification for rules of origin is to prevent 
                                              
9 See further details on AGOA in Brenton and Ikezuki (2004). The African Growth and Opportunity 
Acceleration Act (AGOA III) extends the general timeframe for AGOA preferences until 2015 and the 
third-country fabric manufacturing provision for least developed AGOA beneficiary countries until 2007. 
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trade deflection, whereby products from non-participating countries destined to the free 
trade area partner are redirected through the other free trade partners to avoid the 
payment of customs duties.10 When products are produced in a single stage then the 
origin of the products should be relatively easy to establish. For all other cases the rules 
of origin define the methods by which it can be determined that the product has been 
sufficiently processed in the free trade partner to qualify for preferential access. The 
specification of rules of origin has become especially important in recent years as 
technological progress and globalization have led to the increasing fragmentation of the 
production process into different stages or tasks which are undertaken in different 
locations. Administration costs reduce effective preference margins. In order to assess to 
what extent preference schemes can deliver gains to the beneficiary countries in this 
section we examine the importance of the preference margin on the uptake of 
preferences. 
 In an early seminal paper, Herin (1986) argues that the costs of documentation 
and the administration of origin rules applied by the EEC imposed costs on exporters 
located in EFTA countries equivalent to some 3 percent of the value of the goods traded. 
Carrère and de Melo (2004) provide non-parametric estimates for compliance costs of 
rules of origin based on the average rate of tariff preference for NAFTA members. The 
authors conclude that average total compliance costs for 2001 were 6.2%. When using 
double-censored tobit estimation techniques the authors obtain a compliance cost 
estimate of 3.9% for products where the utilization rate is below 100%.11 For developing 
countries these costs are expected to be even higher, due to information disadvantages, 
institutional weaknesses, etc. 
 
3.1 The Estimating Framework 
We use a threshold technique to estimate what is the minimum preference margin 
(difference between preferential and non-preferential tariff) needed under which traders 
have no incentive to ask for preferences because the costs of obtaining these exceeds 
their benefits. We limit the analysis to the preferential trade relations of non-least 
developed African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU under the 
Cotonou agreement. Nevertheless, this quantitative assessment can provide a more 
                                              
10 See Brenton and Manchin (2003); more generally on rules of origin, see Hoekman (1993). 
11 See also Anson et al. (2004).  
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general proxy for the costs traders from developing countries have to bear when 
requesting/obtaining preferential access.12 
 Since there may be other factors than preferential margin influencing the decision 
to ask for preferences we employ the technique recently developed by Hansen (2000) to 
endogenously determine any threshold in the relationship of interest, which allows one to 
control for such other factors. More specifically, this threshold estimation technique is 
ideal when data needs to be split into sub -samples in consideration of some relationship 
of interest. It takes the following form: 
 
gb £+= iiii qexy ,
'
1  (2) 
gb >+= iiii qexy ,
'
2  (3) 
 
In equations (2) and (3), qi is the threshold variable and ? is the threshold parameter 
which splits the sample into two sub-samples. In our case q i is the difference between 
preferential and third country tariffs, and ? is the threshold value under which traders 
have no incentives to request preferences. The threshold parameter can be determined 
endogenously by allowing the continuously distributed qi to be an element of x i. This 
model allows the regression parameters to differ depending on the value of qi.  The 
model can be re-written into a single equation: 
 
iinii exxy ++= )('
'' gdb  (4) 
 
In equation (4), ß=ß 2 and )()( gg iii dxx = , and { }gg £= ii qd )( is a dummy variable.  
The first step is to identify the threshold value ? and the other coefficients. This is done 
by using the algorithm provided by Hansen (2000), which searches through the values of 
? until the splitting value is found (this is the value of ? which minimizes the 
concentrated sum of squared errors based on an OLS regression).  
Most of the x i variables included in our threshold regression are typical variables 
used in gravity models—probably the most robust empirical relationship explaining the 
volume of bilateral trade flows. To identify the threshold value in the preferential margin 
we estimate to following equation: 
                                              
12 In the analysis in Section 4 below we take into account that for a subset of LDCs, AGOA has 
substantially reduced the costs of rules of origin. 
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In equation (5), Yijk is the utilization rate of Cotonou preferences for product k, in other 
words the percentage of country i's imports of product k from country j which requested 
preferential access. The data originates from Eurostat and contains import data at 8-digit 
level for the year 2001. Dutydifferencek is the difference between MFN and preferential 
tariffs for product k. This is the variable (qi) for which we identify a threshold value.  
As a proxy for the trading countries' income and size the GDP (GDP i is the level of 
income in country i) and population (POP i is the population in country i) of both partner 
countries are included in the regression. GDP and population data are taken from the 
World Development Indicators database. D ij is the distance between the partner 
countries and is a proxy for trading costs. Previous empirical results showed that distance 
had an important negative impact on trade. The further away the trading partners are 
located from each other the higher the costs will be for transporting the products. 
Distance is expected to have a significant and negative impact on preferential trade. The 
distance data originates from the CEPII distance database and calculated following the 
great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the capital cities.   
 To investigate the importance of the quality of economic environment in a given 
exporting ACP country an indicator of economic freedom was used (Freedomindex). The index 
was obtained from the Freedom House "Freedom in the World Countries" database. 13 
This is a database containing an annual comparative assessment of the state of political 
rights and civil liberties in 192 countries and 18 related and disputed territories. The 
lower is the index the more economic freedom the country has. We expect that countries 
with greater economic freedom are more open and more likely to trade.  
 To capture historical linkages between trading partners two zero-one type dummy 
variables were included in the regression. FrenchExcolonyij  and NonFrenchExcolony ij take the 
value of 1 if the exporting country (i) was a colony of France or other partner country(j). 
Colonial links often reflect not only historical ties but also that the traders of the two 
                                              
13 For details on the index see: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm. 
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partner countries can speak the same language. If a country was an ex-colony of its 
trading partner trade between the two countries would probably necessitate lower 
transaction costs thus more trade. A separate dummy is included for non-French ex-
colonies and French ex-colonies because we expect that there might be differences in the 
intensities of the trade links for French ex-colonies.14  
 In many aspects, such as size of the economy or the level of development, South 
Africa differs from most of the other countries in our sample. In order to avoid having 
specificities of South Africa drive our results, a dummy taking the value 1 if the exporting 
country is South Africa is included in the regressions. DUMijk are a set of k  dummy 
variables for agriculture, textiles, clothing, footwear, machinery and mineral products. 15  
 Quota k is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the product was eligible for quota 
preferences and zero otherwise. The dummy for quota is included in the regression 
because it is likely that the circumstances for products entering under a preferential quota 
are different than for products entering without quota preferences; for example traders 
using the quota preferences are likely to be better informed. Furthermore, we include a 
dummy (called difference) for agricultural products for which the difference between 
preferential and MFN tariffs exceeds 30%. These agricultural products benefit from 
seasonal preferential duty reduction. Since we have yearly data it was not possible to 
exactly calculate the tariff reduction for these products, we calculated the yearly average 
tariffs, which might overestimate duty reductio n. Although these products only represent 
0.8% of all observations, including a dummy for these products avoids that they inflate 
the threshold estimation.16 
 
3.2 Estimation Results 
In employing our threshold estimation, one cut-off value was identified. The 95% 
confidence interval for the threshold estimates indicates that the threshold obtained is 
between 48 and 52 percentiles. In terms of tariff difference, it is between 4 and 4.5%. 
Figure 2 plots the likelihood ratio sequence for percentiles in the sample ranked by tariff 
difference, and illustrates the clear break in the sample at this range of tariff differences.  
Thus, the preferential tariff must be 4-4.5 percentage points lower than third country 
tariffs for traders to request preferences. This confidence interval is plausibly tight, since 
                                              
14 Only four countries were not colonies in our sample.  
15 From the 23,685 observations, 9,015 are not covered by any sectoral dummies. These observations 
belong to sectors such as metals, vehicles, optics, chemicals, plastics, stones, and glasses.  
16 The variables dutysmall and dutyhigh are discussed below. 
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it has only 341 observations out of 23,685 observations falling within the 48th and 52 nd 
percentiles. To test the robustness of our results, we re-run the threshold regressions 
including country specific fixed effects instead of the country-specific gravity-type 
variables. We obtain the same threshold values for this specification as well: the 
preferential tariff must be lower than the MFN tariff by 4 percentage points.  
 In order to verify that the threshold value identified is correct, a probit regression 
was undertaken using the identified threshold value. The existence of the threshold 
implies that the relationship between duty reduction and utilization rates is constant 
among sub -sets of products but varies between products. For products for which the 
duty reduction is small, the utilization rate might not be significantly influenced by the 
preferences offered, while higher duty reduction should significantly increase utilization 
rates. Thus if the threshold value is correct, the duty reduction under the threshold 
should not significantly influence utilization rate. Table 1 shows the corresponding 
results of the probit regression. Two additional variables were included in order to test if 
the threshold was correctly identified. The variable dutysmall is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the difference between MFN and preferential duty was smaller 
than the threshold. Similarly, the dummy variable dutyhigh takes the value of 1 if the 
difference between tariff rates is higher than the threshold. Both the results of equation 
(2) and (3) confirm the threshold value. The coefficient of the variable measuring duty 
reduction when it is below 4.5% (dutysmall) is negative and insignificant, while when the 
duty reduction is above the threshold (dutyhigh) it increases the probability of utilizing the 
preference scheme. These results confirm that the threshold value was correctly 
identified, in that there is a different relationship between tariff reduction above the 
threshold and the uptake of preferences.  
 What does this threshold imply for trade preferences?  We will continue our 
focus on EU preferential trade as an example. Table 2 presents, for 2001, EU imports 
from LDCs. A further breakdown is provided in Tables 3 and 4.  The tables provide 
estimates of the rate of MFN protection that would be applied to LDC exports to the 
European Union, and underlying trade flows, and the share of imports by sector reported 
as actually entering the EU duty free.  The following points are worth making at this 
stage.  First, for LDCs the most important exports are manufacturing, followed by 
mining products (which are generally duty-free anyway). This is despite the fact that the 
highest utilization of preferences in 2001, as proxied by duty-free-eligible imports, was in 
agriculture. It is obvious that, in the case of agriculture, rates of protection are generally 
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well above the threshold we have identified. In addition, it is much easier to prove origin 
for food (and mining) products.17 It is therefore in manufacturing that we expect rules of 
origin, and related administration burdens, to be harder to overcome. 18  From Table 4, is 
it clear that on average, many EU tariffs in manufacturing are below the threshold we 
have identified.  Yet at the same time, we can also see that there are peak rates that may 
still make utilization of preferences worthwhile. Hence, the pattern suggested in Table 4 
will be a function of the underlying detailed composition of trade in specific products, 
and benefits will hinge on the margin of preference at the tariff-line level.19 
 The results presented in this section indicate that there exists a minimum 
preference margin needed for traders to request preferences. If the difference between 
preferential and third country tariff rates is less than a certain amount, there are no 
incentives for traders to request preferences, since the costs of obtaining the preferences 
are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the preferences. We found 
this threshold for non-LDC ACP countries in their preferential trade with the EU to be 
between 4-4.5%. Although this figure was found looking at a specific group of 
developing countries, it provides an approximation of trade costs implied by preferential 
schemes fo r other countries as well, as the requirements are similar.   
 
4. The Scope for Preference Erosion  
We next turn to a numerical assessment of preference erosion.  Our goal here is to 
estimate the likely scope for any preference erosion if and when the OECD countries 
implement further multilateral tariff reductions.  This involves the application of a global 
general equilibrium model, where preferences are included as part of the benchmark data, 
and where we gauge the impact of OECD tariff reductions on the preference-related 
gains from trade for the LDCs. We also integrate our assessment of the administration 
costs in the previous section, to identify how important this is for identifying the overall 
benefit of preferences, and hence for the impact of preference erosion. 
 
                                              
17 See Stevens a nd Kennan (2004). Candau, Fontagné and Jean (2004) find that under-utilization of 
preferences is highest in textiles and garments (for EU imports under both the GSP and EBA programs). 
In the case of EBA, exporters in principle benefit from 100 percent duty-free access, but are found to pay 
up to 6.5 percent average tariffs.  
18 This is not to say agricultural preferences are not affected by administrative barriers. We would however 
expect these to be related more to prohibitive sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.  
19 Simple regression analysis of the data in Table 3 confirms that the share of duty-free trade, and hence the 
implicit utilization of preferences, is indeed significantly, positively correlated with the peak tariff rates in 
the table. 
 15 
4.1 The mechanics of erosion 
To examine the basic mechanics of preferences, and preference erosion, we start with 
Figure 3.  In the figure, we have an archetype OECD country importing varieties of good 
X from two suppliers, indicated as SLDC and Snon- LDC.  Trade preferences are represented 
by a reduction in the tariff applied to imports from the LDC. The result is an increase in 
exports by the LDC supplier from XLDC,0 to XLDC,1.  The benefit for the LDC exporter is 
represented by area A.  At the same time, there will be a shift in demand away from 
imports from the non-preferential supplier.  This results in a cost represented by area B, 
which represents the loss in exporter surplus.  The magnitude of these costs and benefits 
depends on underlying supply and demand responsiveness to price changes, as well as 
the degree of substitution between preferential and non-preferential suppliers. The 
impact on the importer depends on a mix of effects –  terms of trade, trade creation, and 
trade diversion. On net, trade preferences therefore involve a mix of benefits for 
preferential exporters, costs imposed on third-country exporters, and potential losses for 
the importer as well (Panagariya, 2000). Basically, trade preferences are a beggar-thy-
neighbor type of foreign aid—robbing Peter to pay Paul. 20 
 Starting from the picture of preferences in Figure 3, their elimination then 
involves a reversal of the process shown in the figure.  The importer recovers tariff 
revenue, and potentially realizes terms of trade gains.  Import demand shifts back to the 
non-preferential supplier, who recovers the exporter surplus B.  The preferential supplier 
loses exporter surplus gains A. 
 Preference erosion is a similar process, but one involving the elimination of 
tariffs on the non-preferential supplier. This is shown in Figure 4. Elimination of the 
tariff on remaining third -country suppliers, given the duty free access already for 
preferential suppliers, means that third-country exporters see their exports increase from 
Xnon-LDC,1 to Xnon- LDC,2.  There is a gain in exporter surplus of area E, which may be greater 
or less than the original loss of exporter surplus resulting from the preferences, area B in 
                                              
20 Only if the (more) preferred developing country (countries) is (are) small in the sense of not at all 
affecting the internal price in the importing nation will there be no detrimental effect on third country 
competitors. If so, the preference only creates trade (expands imports), to the detriment of local suppliers 
in the preference granting country, but not to other foreign suppliers, as they continue to confront the 
same price. See Baldwin and Murray (1977) for an early discussion. Most empirical studies conclude 
however that preference programs are associated with negative terms of trade effects for excluded (less 
preferred) countries, i.e., there is trade diversion as well as trade creation. Much depends on having good 
estimates of the elasticities of substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between foreign 
products of different origin. Early studies assumed these elasticities were identical. General equilibrium 
studies—including the one undertaken later in this paper—by contrast tend to use Armington elasticities. 
For more discussion, see Brown (1987), Langhammer and Sapir (1987) and the references cited there.  
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Figure 3.  The preferential supplier sees a drop in demand for his exports from DLDC,1 to 
DLDC,2.  This results in a partial, though generally not full, loss of the benefits from the 
original preference scheme.  This is represented by area C, which is shown as being less 
than area A in Figure 3.  The reason the loss is not complete is that preferences include, 
in part, the benefits relative to the original tariff-ridden equilibrium from a non-
discriminatory tariff reduction by the importer.  We therefore have preference erosion 
generally yielding a partial, though not full, loss of the original benefits of the preference 
scheme. At the same time, third-countries recover some of the costs originally imposed 
by the preference scheme.  
 We should add a few caveats to the discussion at his stage.  First, to the extent 
there is market power on the part of either importers (Francois and Wooton 2005) or the 
transport and logistics sector (Francois and Wooton 2001), we can expect the benefits of 
tariff reductions to be captured, at least in part, by those intermediaries with market 
power rather than the exporters themselves.  There is evidence, based on the AGOA 
preference scheme, that the pass through of preference margins is indeed partial at best.  
Olarreaga and Özden (2005) find that the average export price increase for products 
benef iting from preferences under AGOA was about 6 percent, whereas the average 
MFN tariff for these products was some 20 percent. Thus, on average exporters received 
around one-third of the tariff rent. Moreover, poorer and smaller countries tended to 
obtain lower shares—with estimates ranging from a low of 13 percent in Malawi to a 
high of 53 percent in Mauritius.21 In addition, based on our analysis in the previous 
section, we should expect administration costs related to these programs to also chew up 
some of the benefits.  In the case of market power, the result is a simple redistribution of 
the benefits of preferences (rents) being transferred to importers. With administration 
costs, however, the share of the gains that is lost is not redistributed, but is really a 
deadweight loss.  In both cases, the trade effects of preference programs will be less as 
well. 
 
4.2 A numerical assessment 
We now turn to a numerical assessment of the likely magnitudes involved.  While there 
has been a great deal of political weight attached to this issue, this debate has largely been 
taking place in a vacuum of real information on the costs and benefits involved. 
                                              
21 See Ozden and Sharma (2004) for a similar analysis of the CBI program. Tangermann (2002) also notes 
that exporters often do not capture all the rents.  
 17 
Moreover, the exceptions have focused almost exclusively on the effects of preference 
erosion on the exports of beneficiary countries.22 Our assessment uses a global, multi-
region general equilibrium model of trade.  The model includes 34 regions/countries and 
24 sectors (Table 5). The social accounting data come from the GTAP database 
(http://www.gtap.org) and are benchmarked to 2001. These data include national 
production and international trade flows.   
 The import protection data are based on a thorough and careful effort to include 
use of preferences in a matrix of global import protection (Bouet et al. 2004). These data 
are the product of a joint effort between the UN International Trade Centre, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade And Development  (UNCTAD), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the Paris-based Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).  An important contribution of this project has 
been an exhaustive coverage of preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) across the world, 
combined with calculation of the AVE of specific duties. Combined with differences in 
the bilateral composition of trade, the result is that protection varies by sector and 
partner for each importer. These data have in turn been integrated with the GTAP 
database for 2001. We have modified these data further to assume full utilization of the 
2001 EU Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative as well as AGOA for those African 
countries benefiting from more liberal rules of origin, as this has been implemented over 
a period extending beyond the benchmark year of the original protection data. We have 
also imposed the elimination of ATC quotas on textiles and clothing on the benchmark, 
an event which occurred on January 1, 2005. This is of course an important dimension of 
preference erosion in its own right, insofar as the constraint on the most efficient 
producers under the ATC implied there was an “implicit” preference for the non- or 
less-constrained developing country exporters. The impacts of the ATC are assessed in 
greater detail in Francois, Spinanger, and Woertz (2005)—we return to the magnitude of 
the associated erosion in the concluding section.  
 The model itself is a relatively standard general equilibrium model, with Cobb -
Douglas consumer demand over broad categories, and CES-based demand within 
product categories. For primary sectors, this is Armington-based trade (see the discussion 
in Francois and Reinert 1997), while other sectors are modeled as being monopolistically 
competitive.  Scale elasticity estimates are based on Antweiler and Trefler (2002) and 
                                              
22 See e.g., IMF (2003), Alexandraki and Lankes (2004), Brenton and Ikezuki (2004). Earlier efforts at 
quantifying the value of preferential access for LDCs such as Ianchovichina at al. (2003) did not have 
access to accurate information on preferences for these countries.  
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Francois (2001).23 Factor supplies are fixed nationally, and are allocated between sectors 
through factor markets.  
 The experiment itself is relatively straightforward. We eliminate, on a multilateral 
basis, all OECD import tariffs on all goods. This includes the ad -valorem equivalents 
(AVEs) of specific tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, and takes into account the prevailing 
preference programs as reported in CEPII.  We also conduct a sub-experiment, where 
we eliminate these tariffs first for the EU alone. This gives us a chance to identify the full 
magnitude of preference erosion for a sample of least developed and low -income 
countries (conceptually represented by area C in Figure 3), and also to identify the share 
of these effects that are due to EU preferences.  Finally, we then re-calculate our estimate 
of EU preference erosion after adjusting for the administrative cost threshold of 4 
percent identified in the previous section.  This has a substantial impact on the estimated 
scope for preference erosion.     
 Our estimates of the dollar impact of full preference erosion on real national 
income are shown in Table 6. We have included the impact on the LDCs in Sub -Saharan 
Africa, as well as other low -income countries in our sample (using the World Bank 
classification of countries by income). The tables reveal that EU preferences are very 
important, as a bilateral measure, for Sub -Saharan African countries. Given the current 
trade policy landscape, we estimate EU preferences to be potentially worth some $460 
million annually to African LDCs. Asian countries benefit less, with the exception of 
Bangladesh ($100 million). These are therefore countries that stand to lose—all other 
things equal—from a move by the EU to lower MFN trade protection. Other developing 
country groups stand to gain—these are the “less preferred” in the overall hierarchy of 
preferences.24 Although we are not convinced that the potential preference rents all 
actually accrue to the exporting countries (again, see Olarreaga and Özden 2005), our 
estimates provide a measure of what is at stake.25  
Our welfare estimates cannot be compared directly to the results obtained in 
recent partial equilibrium-based analyses such as IMF (2003) and Alexandraki and Lankes 
(2004) as these focus solely on trade effects. The IMF estimates the potential export 
revenue lo ss from preference erosion resulting from a 40 percent cut in protection by 
                                              
23 See Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) for details. The model is documented in Anderson, Francois, and 
Hoekman (forthcoming) and is available for download at http://www.intereconomics.com/francois.   
24 The income effects are mirrored in the trade effects in Table 4, which reveals that export reductions map 
to income reductions. This is fully consistent with our earlier discussion centered on Figures 2 and 3. 
25 As discussed further in the concluding section a case can be made that even if exporters do not get the 
rents they should get them. In any discussion that focuses on offsetting the loss from preference erosion 
one can argue that account should be taken of any “missing” rents.  
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Canada, the EU, Japan and the US at some $530 million. This assumes full utilization of 
preferences and that developing countries get all of the associated rents. Alexandraki and 
Lankes (2004), focusing on middle-income countries only, conclude that potential 
erosion impacts are less than 2 percent of total exports for the countries that are most 
“preference dependent”.  
Limão and Olarreaga (2005) are to our knowledge the only paper to undertake an 
analysis of the welfare effects of complete preference erosion. They calculate what the 
income transfer to LDCs would need to be that would be equivalent in to the transfer 
implied by existing preference programs. They conclude that for LDCs the figure is $266 
million. This is a one-year, short-run effect—all else equal the net present value is argued 
to be several times higher. Their results are in line with ours, assuming away the 
compliance costs associated with preference programs (which they do).  
If we view the issue of preference erosion in the broader context of potential 
tariff reduction by all OECD countries, not just EU members, the magnitude of the total 
losses is reduced. In part this is because the EU has been the most aggressive in using 
preferences as a tool for development assistance—such programs in other OECD 
countries have tended to be subject to greater exceptions (an example has been the non-
inclusion of apparel in US GSP programs). Thus, the gains associated with non-EU 
MFN tariff reductions will partially offset losses due to EU liberalization. In the case of 
Sub -Saharan Africa our estimates suggest that overall losses will be reduced by a factor of 
four—to $110 million. In addition, low -income countries in Asia stand to gain a lot from 
other OECD tariff reductions.  
 What are the implications of taking into account our threshold estimates of 
compliance costs? In Table 7 we report a second set of estimates for preference erosion 
tied to EU preferences. Recall from Table 6 that the EU preferences are the dominant 
issue at play. The estimates in Table 7 are based on our earlier estimate of the compliance 
cost for EU trade preferences being some 4% of the value of the goods exported. We 
eliminate these costs as part of the experiment in Table 7. In other words, we assume 
that with zero tariffs, the need to enforce rules of origin becomes moot. Moreover, we 
make this adjustment for goods that (1) are classified as manufactured goods (reflecting 
the observation in the literature that utilization rates are high for non-manufactures in the 
case of African exports), and (2) offer a potential preference margin of at least 4 
percentage points (Table 4). Another way to view this is that we adjust downward the 
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potential benefit of preferences by the value of the margin, up to 4 percent points of the 
total value of a tariff concession. 
 We find that the magnitude of preference erosion changes somewhat overall, 
with the change varying across countries. For Bangladesh, which is specialized  in high 
tariff categories like clothing that are subject to restrictive rules of origin, the magnitude 
of potential erosion is cut by half. For Madagascar, potential losses turn into potential 
gains. The reason for these results is that the compliance costs associated with 
implementing preference programs biases upward estimates of the value of preferences. 
For countries specialized in agriculture – Malawi and Zambia for example –  the effects of 
accounting for compliance costs are much smaller due to our assumption—based on 
other studies (Stevens and Kennan, 2004; Candau et al. 2004)—that compliance costs are 
not a big issue. 26 Overall, allowing for rules compliance costs, we no longer have any real 
losses for African LDCs in total, though we do for individual countries. What this says 
then is that on net, EU preferences do not really offer benefits to African LDCs. To the 
extent individual countries benefit, blocking multilateral reductions to maintain these 
benefits really involves hurting some (neighboring) countries, with no real net benefits 
for the region as a whole. It also points to the need for country-by-country analysis and 
assessments of the potential impacts of preference erosion.27 
The results from Tables 6 and 7 imply that the magnitude of any transfer needed 
to offset (or compensate for) the effect of erosion is much smaller in a context where all 
OECD countries liberalize than in a bilateral EU context. LDCs do stand to lose from 
tariff reductions in sectors or products where preferences matter. However, they also 
stand to benefit from improved access to OECD markets; a process that at least partially, 
and often substantially, offsets the more direct losses on a bilateral basis from erosion of 
preference margins. We should note that this offset is most likely to be an underestimate, 
because of the assumption that developing countries themselves do not liberalize. 
Independent of the welfare economic implications of this assumption, as noted 
previously, it is an appropriate constraint to impose given the political economy-cum-
                                              
26 We can note in passing that this implies that the compliance cost estimate obtained in Section 3 will in 
fact be higher than 4 percent on average for manufactures. This also biases upward our calculation of the 
potential value of erosion.  
27 IMF (20003) concludes that individual LDCs may suffer more than average due the concentration of 
their exports in products that enjoy deep preferences. Of the LDCs, Cape Verde, Haiti, Malawi, 
Mauritania, and São Tomé and Príncipe are found to be the most vulnerable to preference erosion. 
Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) conclude that six middle -income countries —Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia—would also be significantly affected, with predicted export declines ranging 
from 11.5 percent for Mauritius to 7.8 percent for Fiji. 
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negotiating context in which the preference erosion question is placed. The issue at hand 
is the magnitude of erosion of benefits that stem from removal of an explicit 
development-motivated policy that has been put in place by O ECD countries. From this 
perspective it is not relevant that there are other sources of offsetting market access 
and/or terms of trade gains—be it from liberalization by other developing countries or 
own liberalization. 
Finally, it is informative to place our estimates in the context of ongoing changes 
in the trading system. Table 8 compares our estimates of preference erosion to a set of 
estimates (based on the application of the same basic computational model by Francois 
Spinanger and Woerz, 2005), of the impact of the January 1, 2005 elimination of 
remaining textile and clothing quotas for developing countries. This was the final stage of 
implementing the 1994 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). These 
restrictions were another form of beggar-thy-neighbor trade preferences, as they 
(implicitly) favored smaller, higher-cost developing country suppliers at the expense of 
exports from China. The reason of course is that by restricting the most competitive 
suppliers, incentives were created for importers to source from other developing 
countries. As can be seen in Table 8, for sub-Saharan Africa the negative effects of the 
ATC are significant, although they are smaller than for Asian countries such as India and 
Vietnam. These losses reflect a combination of greater competition from China and loss 
of quota rents. 
For Africa, the ATC-induced negative impact is smaller than our estimates of the 
potential magnitude of Doha Round preference erosion if no account is taken of 
compliance costs. However, if account is taken of compliance costs, the potential trade 
preference losses are a less important issue than those associated with lifting of ATC 
textile and clothing quotas.28 From a practical perspective this conclusion is bolstered by 
the fact that the ATC effect is “here and now,” whereas additional Doha Round -based 
erosion will only occur in the future and thus needs to be discounted appropriately.29  
 As other recent studies of this issue (like the IMF 2003) focus on trade effects, in 
Table 9 we report on export effects.  These map to the income effects reported in Table 
8.  Again, for some countries, like Botswana, Mozambique, and Madagascar, there is a 
                                              
28 Note that strictly speaking this comparison cannot be made as the textiles and clothing erosion estimates 
assume zero compliance costs. However, as the ATC was based on quotas with associated rents that were 
equivalent to tariffs well above our threshold value of compliance costs, overall such costs are not likely to 
have had major effects in relative terms.  
29 As mentioned previously, the ATC effects noted here have been incorporated into the baseline scenario, 
i.e., it is assumed that the associated effects have already played themselves out. 
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significant drop in exports with full preference erosion.  However, these preference-
based export gains are, in a sense, at the expense of other countries in the region.  
Overall, it is clear the region would benefit overall from MFN-based tariff reductions by 
the OECD, despite the erosion of preferences. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Because of concern that OECD tariff reductions will translate into worsening export 
performance for the LDCs, trade preferences may be a stumbling block to obtaining 
broad -based support for deep liberalization by OECD countries in the Doha Round. In 
this paper we have examined the magnitude of potential preference erosion, based on an 
econometric assessment of the actual utilization of preferences, and the scope for 
erosion estimated by modeling full elimination of OECD tariffs and hence full erosion. 
We find strong evidence that preferences are underutilized due to administrative burdens. 
This presumably reflects rules of origin and similar hurdles placed in the way of actually 
utilizing trade preferences. The implication is that the actual value of preferences is 
reduced quite substantially. In addition, in US dollar terms we find that the primary 
negative impact of erosion follows from the removal of EU trade barriers. This suggests 
that the erosion problem is primarily a bilateral, not a WTO-based concern. Indeed, 
multilateral liberalization by all OECD countries can serve to substantially reduce the 
aggregate amount of erosion losses. 
What are the policy implications of our analysis? Preferences can only have an 
impact if there is a non-zero tariff in the importing market. Two-thirds of the major 
items Africa exports to Canada, for example, face zero MFN tariffs; and 69% of EU 
imports from Africa (by value) in 2000 were in items facing zero MFN duties (Stevens 
and Kennan, 2004). Raising trade barriers in order to increase the value of preferential 
access would be globally welfare reducing, although it is sometimes suggested. More 
common is the argument used by vested interests in the OECD that preferred 
developing countries should not lose any more preferential access to their (highly 
distorted) markets. The result is the potential for status quo bias reflecting a “bootlegger-
Baptist” coalition between protectionist interests and development NGOs in the North 
and developing country governments in the South. This would impose a significant 
opportunity cost from a global efficiency perspective.  
One solution would be to agree to compensate developing countries for 
preference erosion (Page, 2004). Given the systemic downsides, limited benefits, and 
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historical inability of many poor countries in Africa and elsewhere to use preferences, a 
decision to shift away from preferential “trade as aid” toward more efficient and effective 
instruments to support poor countries could both improve development outcomes and 
help strengthen the multilateral trad ing system (Hoekman, 2004). More effective 
integration of the poorest countries into the trading system requires instruments aimed at 
improving the productivity and competitiveness of firms and farmers in these countries. 
Supply constraints are the primary factors that have constrained the ability of many 
African countries to benefit from preferences.30 This suggests that the main need is to 
improve trade capacity and facilitate diversification. In part this can be pursued through a 
shift to more (and more effective) development assistance that targets domestic supply 
constraints as well as measures to reduce the costs of entering foreign markets.  
The additional transfers associated with a decision to compensate countries for 
lost preferences are not large relative to existing aggregate official development 
assistance—currently in the $65 billion range. As noted the issue is to a large extent a 
bilateral one, in that most of the prospective loss is generated by MFN liberalization by 
the EU. We would argue that the amount needed should be based on our bilateral 
analysis, as that generates the best measure of the value attached to the preference 
program. That is, even though compliance costs are very important determinants of the 
value of preferences, from a compensation perspective they should be ignored —after all, 
they imply that recipients are less able to use the programs. 
 
 
                                              
30 Page (2004), Stevens and Kennan (2004).  
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Table 1:  Results of the endogenous threshold  regression 
 (1) (2) 
Ldist 0.077 -0.424 
 (4.11)** (6.43)** 
lgdp 0.035  
 (12.69)**  
lpop 0.007  
 (2.03)*  
lgdpdecl -0.215  
 (13.10)**  
lpopdecl 0.279  
 (16.67)**  
freedomidicator -0.006  
 (2.21)*  
Frenchcolony 0.075  
 (4.14)**  
NONfrenchcolony 0.008  
 (0.92)  
SouthAfrica -0.316  
 (17.57)**  
DUMagri 0.285 0.331 
 (26.87)** (29.26)** 
DUMtext 0.237 0.219 
 (13.93)** (13.04)** 
DUMfoot 0.131 0.129 
 (5.36)** (5.35)** 
DUMmach -0.199 -0.163 
 (21.56)** (19.42)** 
DUMwood 0.449 0.447 
 (22.16)** (20.05)** 
DUMmineral 0.047 0.114 
 (0.87) (2.13)* 
DUMcloth 0.243 0.219 
 (18.53)** (16.29)** 
dutysmall -0.455 -0.450 
 (1.39) (1.43) 
dutyhigh 0.609 0.479 
 (8.46)** (6.50)** 
Hightariff -0.252 -0.190 
 (7.38)** (4.66)** 
Quota  -0.094 
  (2.76)** 
Country fixed effects  included 
LR  c2(19) =6279.82, Prob>,0.00 c2(57) =9706.34 Prob>,0.00 
Pseudo R2      0.2074 0.3209 
Log likelihood -12001.857                              -10270.878  
Observations 23684 23641 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2 
EU imports from the least -developed countries, 2001  
total EU15 
imports
‘000$US
duty free 
imports 
‘000$US 
sector 
share 
of LDC 
total
duty-
free 
share 
of 
sector
total
share 
subject 
to 
specific 
duties 
Agriculture 905,722 611,791 7.6 67.5 14.0 
Forestry, Fisheries 258,714 174,782 2.2 67.6 0.0 
Mining 3,982,709 3,973,127 33.5 99.8 0.0 
Processed foods 1,035,968 32,188 8.7 3.1 4.2 
Other manufactures 5,720,632 394,087 48.1 6.9 1.4 
TOTAL  11,903,744 5,185,974 100.0 43.6 2.1 
Source: WTO integrated database     
 
 
 
Table 3 
Composition of EU15 processed food imports from LDCs  
total EU15 
imports
‘000$US
free imports 
(no duty 
applied)
‘000$US
free 
import 
share of 
category 
total 
share of 
total 
processed 
food 
imports 
EU 
average 
rate of 
pro-
tection, 
all extra-
EU trade 
Animal products 92 0 0.0 0.0 16.0 
Vegetable oils and fats 104,029 26,506 25.5 10.0 37.7 
Dairy products 99 0 0.0 0.0 18.4 
Processed rice 1,176 0 0.0 0.1 38.6 
Sugar 37,818 0 0.0 3.7 36.7 
Food producs nec 891,547 5,287 0.6 86.1 11.6 
Beverages and tobacco 1,208 394 32.6 0.1 20.3 
TOTAL  1,035,968 32,188 3.1 100.0 15.2 
source: WTO integrated database (trade) and GTAP database (protection) 
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Table 4 
Composition of EU15 manufactures imports from LDCs, 2001   
total EU15 
imports 
‘000US$ 
free 
imports (no 
duty 
applied)
‘000US$
free 
import 
share of 
category
share of 
total 
manu-
factures 
imports
EU MFN 
tariffs, 
weighted 
by LDC 
trade
Maximum 
tariff
Textiles 1,838,393 39,012 2.1 32.1 11.5 12.6
Clo thing 1,977,100 164 0.0 34.6 12.2 12.6
Leather 325,254 38 0.0 5.7 7.4 17.0
Wood products 104,170 24,665 23.7 1.8 1.7 10.0
Paper products 6,926 2,709 39.1 0.1 1.7 9.8
Petroleum and coal products 27,544 0 0.0 0.5 3.9 4.7
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 84,751 29,399 34.7 1.5 3.7 12.8
Non-metalic minerals 21,430 176 0.8 0.4 9.7 12.0
Iron and steel 6,364 4,218 66.3 0.1 0.7 5.7
Non-ferrous metals 640,473 251,514 39.3 11.2 3.5 10.0
Fabricated metal products 7,671 2,166 28.2 0.1 2.3 8.5
Motor vehicles and parts 3,120 143 4.6 0.1 6.8 22.0
Other transport equipment 587,053 78 0.0 10.3 1.4 15.0
Electrical machinery 16,766 15,003 89.5 0.3 0.6 14.0
Other machinery 41,592 9,546 23.0 0.7 1.6 8.0
Other manufactures 32,025 15,258 47.6 0.6 1.4 9.0
TOTAL  5,720,632 394,087 6.9 100.0 9.0 22.0
source: WTO integrated database     
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Table 5: Country-Region and Sectoral Disaggregation in the Model 
Basic sectoring scheme   
  Regions   Sectors 
1 EU25 1Rice 
2 Turkey 2Wheat 
3 Russia 3Other cereals 
4 Other Europe 4Horticulture 
5 Middle East 5Sugar 
6 North Africa 6Meats 
7 Botswana 7Beef 
8 Madagascar 8Dairy 
9 Malawi 9Cotton 
10 Mozambique 10Other agriculture 
11 Tanzania 11Processed foods 
12 Uganda 12Textiles 
13 Zambia 13Clothing 
14 South Africa 14Leather 
15 Other sub -Saharan Africa 15Mining 
16 Canada 16Chemicals 
17 United States 17Metals 
18 Mexico  18Motor Vehicles 
19 Central America 19Mechinery 
20 Caribbean 20Other industry 
21 Argentina  21Construction 
22 Brazil 22Trade 
23 Other South America 23Transport 
24 Japan 24Business 
25 Other high income Asia 25Other services 
26 China    
27 Vietnam    
28 Other Southeast Asia    
29 Bangladesh    
30 India    
31 Sri Lanka    
32 Other Central Asia    
33 Oceania    
34 Australia & New Zealand      
    
Sectors 1-10 are Armington sectors (national differentiation). 
Others are modeled with firm-level differentiation. 
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Table 6 
Income Effects of Full Preference Erosion 
 
  
change in annual national income,  
$US million 
  
Effects of 
EU MFN trade 
liberalization 
Effects of other 
OECD  trade 
liberalization 
Total 
preference loss 
African LDCs -458.3 347.8 -110.5 
Botswana 0.2 16.3 16.4 
Madagascar -7.1 16.9 9.8 
Malawi -22.6 15.6 -7.0 
Mozambique -27.3 13.0 -14.3 
Tanzania 4.6 -3.1 1.5 
Uganda -5.9 1.7 -4.3 
Zambia -18.9 -2.4 -21.3 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs -381.2 289.9 -91.3 
     
Asia/other LDCs 93.4 -180.9 -87.4 
Bangladesh -101.0 -37.2 -138.2 
Other Central/South Asia LDCs 194.4 -143.6 50.8 
     
 Other Low-income 587.4 1463.1 2050.5 
India 174.0 101.8 275.8 
Vietnam 413.4 1361.3 1774.8 
TOTAL  222.5 1630.1 1852.6 
    
LDC and low -income classification is based on World Bank designations. 
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Table 7 
Preference Erosion with Adjustment for Compliance Costs 
  
Change in annual national income, $US million 
  
  
Effects of 
EU 
liberalization, 
unadjusted 
Effects of 
EU 
liberalization, 
adjusted for 
compliance 
costs 
Total 
preference 
loss, 
unadjusted 
Total 
preference loss, 
adjusted  
African LDCs -458.3 -341.5 -110.5 6.3 
Botswana 0.2 -0.3 16.4 16.0 
Madagascar -7.1 0.1 9.8 17.0 
Malawi -22.6 -18.1 -7.0 -2.5 
Mozambique -27.3 -27.3 -14.3 -14.3 
Tanzania 4.6 24.0 1.5 20.9 
Uganda -5.9 0.0 -4.3 1.6 
Zambia -18.9 -18.6 -21.3 -20.9 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs -381.2 -301.3 -91.3 -11.4 
      
Asia/other LDCs 93.4 155.8 -87.4 -25.1 
Bangladesh -101.0 -40.0 -138.2 -77.2 
Other Central/South Asia LDCs 194.4 195.8 50.8 52.2 
     
 Other Low-income 587.4 507.3 2050.5 1970.5 
India 174.0 166.1 275.8 267.9 
Vietnam 413.4 341.3 1774.8 1702.6 
TOTAL  222.5 321.6 1852.6 1951.7 
     
LDC and low -income classification is based on World Bank designations.  
note: adjustments relate to rules of origin and other compliance costs for EU preferences. 
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Table 8 
Income Effects, 
MFN Liberalization-based Preference Erosion and the ATC Phaseout 
 
  change in annual national income, $US million 
  
Total 
preference loss, 
unadjusted
Total 
preference 
loss, adjusted
Total ATC 
quota 
elimination
African LDCs -110.5 6.3 -71.8
Botswana 16.4 16.0 0.2
Madagascar 9.8 17.0 -7.0
Malawi -7.0 -2.5 0.0
Mozambique -14.3 -14.3 -1.7
Tanzania 1.5 20.9 3.2
Uganda -4.3 1.6 -0.3
Zambia -21.3 -20.9 1.7
Other Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs -91.3 -11.4 -68.0
    
Asia/other LDCs -87.4 -25.1 -661.9
Bangladesh -138.2 -77.2 -205.1
Other Central/South Asia LDCs 50.8 52.2 -456.8
    
 Other Low-income 2050.5 1970.5 -274.1
India 275.8 267.9 -478.5
Vietnam 1774.8 1702.6 204.4
TOTAL  1852.6 1951.7 -1007.9
 Source:  Table 7, and Francois, Spinanger, and Woerz (2005). 
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Table 9 
Export Effects,  
MFN Liberalization-based Preference Erosion and the ATC Phaseout 
 
  change in exports, percent  
  
Total 
preference loss, 
unadjusted
Total 
preference 
loss, adjusted
Total ATC 
quota 
elimination
African LDCs 3.7 4.2 -0.1
Botswana -4.2 -4.2 -0.2
Madagascar 7.7 11.2 -1.9
Malawi 12.5 16.0 -0.3
Mozambique -6.0 -7.8 -1.4
Tanzania 2.2 6.3 0.0
Uganda 0.0 1.5 0.0
Zambia -1.7 -1.6 0.3
Other Sub-Saharan Africa LDCs 4.4 4.8 -0.1
      
Asia/other LDCs 7.3 7.6 0.7
Bangladesh 6.0 10.2 -8.2
Other Central/South Asia LDCs 7.5 7.3 1.8
    
 Other Low-income 6.6 6.1 1.4
India 2.5 2.4 1.4
Vietnam 22.9 20.7 1.5
TOTAL  6.0 6.0 0.7
 Source:  Model estimates, and Francois, Spinanger, and Woerz (2005). 
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Figure 1 
 
 
GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa and NIEA(8), 1960-99
(Measured at 1987 prices and exchange rates)
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Figure 2 
Likelihood ratio sequence 
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Figure 3 
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